ISO 9001 — Quality Management System
Processes executed in a defined, measurable and auditable way.
Certificates, the gates an AI request passes through, multi-tenant isolation, encryption, key management, backup and retention, subprocessors, incident notification and responsible disclosure. Nothing on this page is a number we cannot verify — and where a figure belongs in a contract rather than on a website, we say so explicitly.
The PDFs of four management system certificates are downloadable below. The certification body, the scope statement and the validity date are printed on the certificate itself — we deliberately do not repeat the date here, because an expired date left sitting on a web page misleads more than the certificate itself ever could. Read the date from the document.
Processes executed in a defined, measurable and auditable way.
Asset classification, access control, risk management and incident management framework.
Disruption scenarios defined in advance, recovery plans exercised and reviewed.
Governance across the AI lifecycle: purpose definition, risk assessment, human oversight and traceability.
Turkish data protection law (KVKK) is not a certification subject; it is a statutory obligation handled through separate documents. We keep those out of the certificate list on purpose: KVKK information notice, retention and destruction policy, data subject application form.
Scope, validity period and verifiable document link for each ISO certificate.
A security claim is only auditable once the flow is visible. The sequence below is identical every time a user asks a question or an automation fires. A local model and a cloud model pass through the same gates — the gate does not change with the model.
Every request arrives with the identity and role of the signed-in user. There is no anonymous AI call.
Role-based access control and row-level security apply to AI as they do to people. Fields are filtered by role; a field the user cannot see is never sent to the model.
GuardrailPipeline: PII, prompt-injection and cost detectors inspect the request. Violations are written to the audit trail.
Work goes to the model you chose: 361 Local running inside the machine, or a provider you enabled. With localOnly on, cloud models are not listed and are categorically refused if requested.
When the model calls a tool, the permission policy applies. Risky tools route the flow to human approval; without approval nothing executes.
The answer returns through the same pipeline: PII masking and hallucination checks can be enforced on output as well.
Agent execution, tool call, data access, data modification, approval decision, configuration change, guardrail violation, data export and deletion — all recorded immutably.
Traces, metrics and logs are collected via OpenTelemetry and can be wired into your existing observability stack.
In an AI deployment the real risk is not what the model says but what it can reach. Because the authorization context is established at step 02, no matter how capable the model is it cannot see data beyond the requesting user's permissions. The long-form version lives in topics three and four of the IT Review Pack.
"Your data is isolated" says nothing on its own; the question is which layer enforces it. On shared infrastructure, isolation is not one control but five separate ones.
Usage, cost and configuration data are held in each tenant's own directory. One tenant's record cannot be read from another.
Connection details and provider keys are encrypted per tenant with AES-256. Nothing is stored in plaintext.
Integration connections are isolated per tenant. Each organisation sees and uses only the connections it defined; there is no shared connection pool.
Channel events carry tenant scoping: an event is delivered only to subscriptions in its own tenant and cannot spill into a neighbouring one.
Every installation has its own RSA-2048 key pair. Entitlements travel in a manifest signed for that installation; another installation's manifest is not valid.
Role-based access control and row-level security apply to both people and AI. Isolation does not stop at the storage layer; it continues inside the query.
If shared infrastructure does not fit your policy, the tenancy discussion closes before it starts: on-premise and air-gapped deployments share nothing. The comparison is on the Deployment Models page.
All traffic is encrypted with TLS 1.3. Outbound calls and inbound webhooks carry signature verification.
Stored data is encrypted with AES-256. Provider and connection secrets are additionally held encrypted per tenant.
Keys issued by the platform are stored as hashes; the clear value is never kept. Lose a key and it cannot be recovered, only reissued — not a shortcoming but the direct consequence of how it is stored.
With 361 Local the model runs inside the machine, so no prompt, document or embedding leaves it. The transport question closes because there is no transport.
How a key is stored matters as much as how it is rotated and who may use it. All four are defined.
API keys can be rotated with a transition window in which the old and the new key are both valid, so integrations move over without a break. When the window closes, the old key is invalidated.
Per key you can define an IP allow-list, a per-minute rate limit and a daily quota. A leaked key is unusable from outside the defined network.
Cloud AI provider keys are managed centrally, encrypted per tenant and never returned to the interface in clear text. Even in a hybrid deployment these keys do not reach the client.
Each installation holds its own RSA-2048 key pair and entitlements travel in a signed manifest. One installation's manifest will not run on another.
The local runtimes (embedded llama.cpp, Ollama, LM Studio) need no provider key — with no secret to manage there is no secret to leak.
Six types are supported for outbound connections: none, Basic, Bearer, API key, OAuth 2.0 (three flows) and Digest.
Backup scope and retention period are two different questions: the first is "can I get it back", the second is "how long should I keep it". Both are configurable; the defaults are below.
What is needed to bring an installation back:
Adjustable to your policy; these are the out-of-the-box values:
A deletion request starts a 30-day undo window; afterwards deterministic anonymisation is applied and the record identity is severed irreversibly. Related fields in audit records are masked — the audit trail itself is not deleted.
The local model runs in a separate process; a model crash does not stop the platform, and a continuously restarting process cannot tie the system up. Schema changes do not require a restart. When connectivity drops, the offline queue de-duplicates requests: within a 24-hour window a resent request does not create a second record.
Recovery point objective (RPO) and recovery time objective (RTO) depend on the deployment model you choose, your backup frequency, your hardware and your data volume. Publishing one number for everyone would produce a commitment that is wrong for your installation, so we publish none.
Once the deployment model and backup plan are settled, RPO/RTO targets are measured during the POC and stated in writing in the service agreement. The business continuity framework is operated under the ISO 22301 certificate.
The answer to the subprocessor question changes fundamentally with the deployment model. Instead of one list, here is what holds in each model.
There are no subprocessors. With localOnly on, no prompt, document or embedding crosses the organisational boundary; with nothing leaving, there is nothing being processed outside.
The subprocessor set consists of the providers and channels you enable. The platform supports 17 AI providers and 44 adapters across 8 channel families, but which ones are switched on is your decision — and no data reaches a provider you have not enabled.
We do not publish a generic subprocessor list, because the list differs from installation to installation: one customer runs the local runtime only, another has two cloud providers and three channels enabled. An "average" list would be wrong for both.
For your installation, the name, function, data category and data residency of every active hosting, AI provider and channel subprocessor is provided in writing as an annex to the agreement, and any change to that set is notified in advance. We will also share it during evaluation on request — contact us.
An incident can only be noticed if it was recorded first. The technical foundation and the process side are stated separately.
The immutable audit trail records ten event types: agent execution, tool call, chat message, data access, data modification, approval decision, configuration change, guardrail violation, data export and data deletion. Guardrail violations are separately queryable. Traces and metrics are collected via OpenTelemetry.
Who is notified, through which channel and within what time is defined in the service agreement. Where an event falls within the scope of a personal data breach, the statutory notification duties under Turkish data protection law apply in addition — those are not contingent on the contract.
We do not publish incident history. Contracted customers receive written reports on incidents affecting their own installation; there is no public incident log.
There is no "we have never had an incident" claim either. Unless it is verifiable, a sentence like that produces risk rather than trust — so we don't write it.
If you have found a security issue, reach us before you publish it. We will assess it, fix it, and credit you if you wish.
Email: info@361.com.tr — putting "Security report" in the subject line is enough.
The machine-readable equivalent is published in RFC 9116 format: /.well-known/security.txt
We acknowledge receipt, reproduce, assess impact and fix. We keep you informed throughout and will credit you as the reporter if you want. We will not pursue legal action over good-faith research conducted within these rules.
There is no paid bug bounty programme. We also publish no committed first-response time — we would rather state nothing than state a target we cannot hold. When either changes, this section and security.txt will be updated together.
This page is an entry point; each topic is written once, in depth, on its own page.
Access control, guardrail detectors, audit trail, observability and data residency with 361 Local.
Every question IT and security teams ask before purchase, in eight topics, printable.
SaaS, private cloud, on-premise and air-gap — what works, what does not, who owns what.
Exporting your data, resilience to interruption, the right to delete and the four steps of an exit.
Hardware table, bundled model set, the local stack and the "local or cloud" decision table.
Information notice, retention and destruction policy, data subject applications, explicit consent and AI user information.
Send us your security questionnaire and we will answer it line by line at architecture level. If an item has no answer, we will mark it as such rather than fill it in.