Does the deployment have to be in the cloud?
No. On-prem deployment is supported. Fully disconnected (air-gap) operation is supported as well — the platform can run on a network with no outbound connectivity at all.
In enterprise AI evaluations, what usually holds up the process isn't the product — it's the unanswered security questions. This page answers everything IT and information security teams ask before purchase, across eight topics, briefly and technically. Print it and drop it straight into your evaluation file.
The first question in any enterprise review is always the same: where does the data go? The answer is given at the architecture level, not as a promise.
No. On-prem deployment is supported. Fully disconnected (air-gap) operation is supported as well — the platform can run on a network with no outbound connectivity at all.
In localOnly mode, cloud models never appear in the model list at all. If a cloud model is explicitly requested, the request is categorically rejected — no call is made. This is a runtime constraint, not a policy preference.
Provider keys stay on the platform administrator side and never reach the tenant space. They are always masked in the admin panel; no interface ever displays the clear value.
Yes. Sensitive workloads can run on a local model and non-sensitive ones on cloud AI providers; the choice is defined per model and per agent. 17 AI providers are supported, and switching provider is a matter of configuration.
When shared infrastructure is involved, the question is which layer enforces isolation. Isolation exists separately at the storage, encryption, integration, event distribution and authorization layers.
In each tenant's own directory. There is no cross-tenant access — one tenant's usage records cannot be read from another tenant.
Encrypted per tenant with AES-256. Nothing is stored in plain text.
No. Integration connections are isolated per tenant; each customer organization sees and uses only the connections it has defined itself.
No. Channel event distribution is tenant-guarded; an event is delivered only to subscriptions belonging to its own tenant.
Yes. Every customer deployment has its own RSA-2048 key pair. Entitlements travel in a signed manifest bound to that deployment; another deployment's manifest is not valid.
The critical distinction: the enterprise authorization model applies not only to the user but to the AI as well. The AI cannot see data the user cannot see.
No. Role-based access control and row-level security apply to the AI exactly as they do to the user. The AI operates within the authorization context of the requesting user.
Role-aware field filtering: the entity fields exposed to the AI are filtered by the user's role. The salary field is visible only to the HR role; for every other role the field is never passed to the model.
Yes. An allowed-role list can be defined per agent; roles outside that list cannot invoke the agent.
API keys are stored as hashes — the clear value is never kept in the system. Rotation supports a transition window, plus IP allow-listing, per-minute rate limits and daily quotas.
Six types: no auth, Basic, Bearer, API key, OAuth 2.0 (three flows) and Digest.
What the AI may do, what it may not do without approval, and how it is stopped are all set at the definition level.
4 detectors + guardrail pipeline are active:
Yes. Tools carry a risk level — low, medium, high, critical — and may require approval according to that level.
The approval flow has three states: pending → approved or rejected. Approval policy is defined per agent: which tools require approval, and the auto-approval timeout.
Emergency stop (break-glass) is persistent: the stop survives a server restart and never lifts itself. Every autonomous operation is written to the audit log.
The cost limit is one of the guardrail detectors. Per-request, per-day and total cost ceilings are defined, and a notification is raised as a threshold is approached.
Auditability is not a report bolted on afterwards — it is part of the runtime.
The audit log is a hash-chained audit log; because records are chained to one another, any tampering breaks the chain and becomes detectable.
Every MCP tool call is written to a daily JSONL file: timestamp, key identity, tool name, arguments, success status and duration. Fields such as passwords, tokens and keys are masked as they are written.
Yes. AI runs keep a trace: step-by-step records, tokens used, duration and cost. What happened at which step can be reviewed retrospectively.
Yes. OpenTelemetry connects it to your existing tracing and metrics infrastructure; a separate console is not required.
Personal data masking and log scrubbing are applied; sensitive fields are masked at the logging layer before being written.
Giving the AI tools does not mean widening the attack surface — tool boundaries are enforced at runtime.
No. The HTTP request tool has SSRF protection: calls to localhost, 127.0.0.1, ::1, 10.x, 172.16-31.x, 192.168.x and 169.254.x are blocked.
Database tools are read-only. SELECT, WITH, SHOW, DESCRIBE and EXPLAIN are allowed; write and schema statements are blocked. More than 22 dangerous statements are blacklisted and SQL comments are stripped — which is how injection hidden inside a comment is prevented.
No. Connection strings are never exposed in API responses, in log records or to the AI.
Yes. The database manager has a read-only lock: while the lock is on, every mutating statement is rejected before it is ever sent.
Webhooks are signed with HMAC; the receiving side verifies the signature and can prove the request genuinely came from the platform.
KVKK (Turkish data protection law) compliance is in place. On the information security side there is an ISO 27001 certificate; the current list of documents is published on the security page.
A deletion request starts a 30-day undo window; after it expires, deterministic anonymization is applied — the record identity is dissociated irreversibly.
Enterprise logging and audit trail are standard; who accessed which data, when and with what operation is on record.
No. The local model runs in a separate process; a model crash does not stop the platform. Crash-loop protection is in place — a continuously restarting process cannot tie up the system.
No. Schema changes need no restart; the definition is updated and the runtime stays up.
No. The offline client queue is idempotent; within a 24-hour window, resending the same request does not create a second record.
361 AI Operating System — IT Review Pack · 361.com.tr/en/it-review.html
Send us your organization's own security checklist and we'll answer each item at the architecture level. Or see it directly in your own environment with a two-week POC.